I Sentences, Distinction 37, Question 2

ARTICULUS III
Utrum esse ubique conveniat Deo ab aeterno
Third Article
Whether to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity.
Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod esse ubique ab aeterno Deo conveniat. Primo per hoc quod in Littera dicitur ab Ambrosio, quia in omnibus et ubique semper est, quod est divinitatis proprium. Sed quod est semper, est aeternum. Ergo esse ubique Deo ab aeterno convenit.We proceed thus to the third issue. 1. It seems that to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity. The first reason for this is what is said by Ambrose in this text of the Sentences, that it is a peculiar quality of divinity that it is always in all things and everywhere. But what is always is eternal. Therefore, to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity.
2. Praeterea, sicut "ubique" est distributivum loci, ita "semper" est distributivum temporis. Sed Deus ab aeterno est semper, etiam temporibus non existentibus. Ergo et ab aeterno est ubique, etiam locis non existentibus.2. Furthermore, as "everywhere" is predicated distributively of place, so "always" is predicated distributively of time. But God is always from eternity, even in non-existent times. Therefore, he is everywhere from eternity, even in non-existent places.
3. Praeterea, esse Deum in rebus coordinatur hic a Magistro ei quod est esse res in Deo. Sed res ab aeterno fuerunt in Deo, qui aeternam scientiam de rebus habet. Ergo et Deus ab aeterno est in rebus, et ubique.3. Moreover, God's being in things is, in this text, coordinated by Lombard to a thing's being in God. But things were from eternity in God, who has an eternal knowledge of things. Therefore, God is in things and is everywhere from eternity.
Sed contra, in quocumque est aliquid illud oportet esse, quia in nihilo nihil omnino est. Sed neque locus neque aliqua res ab aeterno fuerunt. Ergo neque Deo ab aeterno convenit ubique, vel in rebus, esse.But, on the contrary, when something is in anything, that thing must be, because nothing is at all in nothing. But neither place nor any thing was from eternity. Therefore, it does not belong to God to be everywhere or in things from eternity.
SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Deus est ubique, importatur quaedam relatio Dei ad creaturam, fundata super aliquam operationem, per quam Deus in rebus dicitur esse. Omnis autem relatio quae fundatur super aliquam operationem in creaturas procedentem, non dicitur de Deo nisi ex tempore, sicut Dominus et Creator et hujusmodi; quia hujusmodi relationes actuales sunt, et exigunt actu esse utrumque extremorum. Sicut ergo non dicitur operari in rebus ab aeterno, ita nec esse in rebus, quia hoc operationem ipsius designat.Solution: I answer that it should be said that, when it is said, "God is everywhere," a certain relation of God to a creature is expressed that is based on some operation by which God is said to be in things. However, every relation that is based on some operation that proceeds into creatures is said of God only by reason of time, as, for example, "Lord," "Creator," and other such things. For relations of this kind are actual, and they require the being of both extremes in act. Therefore, just as God is not said to operate in things from eternity, so neither is he said to be in things, because this signifies his operation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Ambrosius accipit semper Deum esse ubique, creaturis existentibus; illud enim quod ex parte Dei est, semper est, in quo nihil est novum; sed defectus est ex parte creaturae, quae non semper fuit; unde non potest significari in habitudine ad creaturam ab aeterno, ut operans circa ipsam.To the first, therefore, it should be said that Ambrose assumes that God is always everywhere, when creatures are existing. For that which is from the side of God in whom there is nothing new is always, but what is lacking is from the side of a creature, which was not always. Hence, what is from the side of God cannot be signified in relation to a creature from eternity, such as operating in respect to it.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod "semper" de virtute vocabuli importat indeficientiam quamdam, quam aeternitas totam simul habet, sed tempus per successionem diversorum eam sortitur; et ideo "semper" potest importare indeficientiam quae est per successionem continuam; et sic est distributivum temporum, nec ab aeterno convenit: quia successio et tempus ab aeterno non fuit. Vel potest dicere indeficientiam aeternitatis; et sic ab aeterno convenit. Sed "ubique" in ratione sua includit locum; et ideo similis ratio non est utrobique: "ubi" enim est in loco esse, et "ubique" in omni loco.To the second, it should be said that "always" expresses from the use of the word a certain continuousness, which eternity possesses as simultaneously whole, but time receives it by the succession of different times. And for this reason, "always" can express a continuousness that is by means of a connected succession. In this way, it is predicated distributively of times, but it is not applicable from eternity, because succession and time were not from eternity. Or "always" can designate the continuousness of eternity, and in this way, it is applicable from eternity. But "everywhere" contains place in its concept, and therefore, there is not a similar argument about "always" and "everywhere". For "where" is being in a place, and "everywhere" is being in every place.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut motus rationem ex termino accipit, ita et relatio. Cum autem dicitur Deus esse in rebus, importatur relatio Dei ad creaturas secundum egressum divinae operationis in eas, quia aeternae non sunt, nec esse in eis aeternum esse potest. Sed cum dicitur res esse in Deo, importatur relatio creaturae ad Deum, non secundum exitum ab ipso, sed magis secundum adunationem creaturae ad principium; et quia principium est aeternum, ideo etiam et scire aeternum, et res ab aeterno in Deo. Deus enim est in rebus temporaliter per modum rerum, sed res ab aeterno in Deo per modum Dei; quia omne quod in altero est, est in eo per modum ejus in quo est, et non per modum sui.To the third, it should be said that, just as the concept of motion is understood on account of the thing at one extreme, the same is true about a relation. When it is said that God is in things, God's relation to creatures is expressed according to the going forth of the divine operation into them. For they are not eternal, nor can to be in them be eternal. But when a thing is said to be in God, a creature's relation to God is expressed, not insofar as it goes forth from him, but rather according to the creature's union with its principle. Because this principle is eternal, its knowing is also eternal, and in this way, a thing is in God from eternity. For God is in things temporally according to the mode of things, but a thing is in God from eternity according to God's mode. For every thing that is in something else is in it according to the mode of that in which it is and not according to its own mode.

© John Laumakis
(jlamakis@hilltop.ic.edu)



The Aquinas Translation Project
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