I Sentences, Distinction 10
The Holy Spirit as Love

Art. 5: utrum tantum tres personae sint in divinisArt. 5: Whether there are only three Persons in God
ad quintum sic proceditur. Proceeding thus to the fifth.
videtur quod non sint tantum tres personae in divinis. in divinis enim non plus distat voluntas et natura, quam intellectus. sed alia persona est procedens per modum voluntatis vel amoris, ab illa quae procedit per modum naturae vel generationis. ergo adhuc debet esse alia quae procedat per modum intellectus.Obj. 1: It seems that there are not only three Persons in God. For in God, will does not stand further from nature than intellect does. But the Person proceeding through the mode of will or of love is other than that one who proceeds through the mode of nature or of generation. Therefore there ought to be still another Person, who proceeds through the mode of intellect.
praeterea, sicut pater diligit filium, ita etiam diligit spiritum sanctum. sed amor quo pater diligit filium, est una persona. ergo et amor quo diligit spiritum sanctum, est una persona, et ita sunt plures quam tres.Obj. 2: Further, just as the Father loves the Son, so He also loves the Holy Spirit. But the love by which the Father loves the Son is one Person; therefore the love by which He loves the Holy Spirit is also one Person, and so there are more than three.
item, sicut est perfecta bonitas et liberalitas in patre et filio, ita et in spiritu sancto. sed propter summam bonitatem et liberalitatem convenit patri quod naturam suam communicet alii, quia bonum est communicativum sui. ergo eadem ratione spiritus sanctus communicabit naturam suam perfecta communicatione. sed non perfecte communicat creaturae. ergo communicabit alii divinae personae.Obj. 3: Again, just as there is perfect goodness and liberality in the Father and in the Son, so also in the Holy Spirit. But it belongs to the Father on account of the highest goodness and liberality [which is His] that He communicates His nature to another, since good is communicative of itself. For the same reason, therefore, the Holy Spirit will communicate His nature by a perfect communication. But He does not perfectly communicate [His nature] to the creature. Therefore He will communicate [it] to another divine Person.
item, in deo non tantum est natura et voluntas, sed plura alia attributa, quorum unumquodque habet rationem principii. sed voluntati et naturae respondet aliqua processio, inquantum habent rationem principii. ergo etiam et aliis attributis respondebunt aliae processiones, secundum quas multiplicabuntur personae multo plures quam tres.Obj. 4: Again, in God there is not only nature and will, but many other attributes, any one of which has the ratio of a principle. But some procession corresponds to will and to nature, insofar as they have the ratio of a principle. Therefore to the other attributes in God will correspond still other processions, according to which the Persons will be multiplied to many more than three.
sed contra, videtur quod sint tantum duae. personae enim non distinguuntur nisi secundum relationes originis. sed relatio originis est secundum quam aliquis est ab alio. ergo videtur quod sit tantum una persona, quae sit ens ab alia, et reliqua a qua est alius. ergo sunt tantum duae personae.But against this: it seems that there are only two Persons. For Persons are not distinguished except according to relations of origin. But a relation of origin is that according to which someone is from another. Therefore it seems that there is only one Person who is a being from another [ens ab alia], and the remaining [Person] from whom He is other. Therefore there are only two persons.
respondeo dicendum, quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis. et ratio hujus est, quia in divinis propter essentiae simplicitatem non potest esse distinctio secundum aliquod absolutum, sed secundum relationem, et tantum secundum relationem originis, ut infra probabitur, dist. 26, quaest. 2, art. 2. item, relatio originis non potest constituere personam, si significet in communi; sed oportet quod significet aliquid proprium et determinatum. habet enim se loco differentiae constitutivae respectu personae, quam oportet esse propriam. item, quia persona est nomen dignitatis, oportet quod illa relatio sit ad dignitatem pertinens. sic ergo oportet tria considerare in constituentibus personas, scilicet quod sit relatio originis, quod sit propria, quod sit ad dignitatem pertinens. relatio autem originis in communi importatur in his duobus, qui ab alio, et a quo alius. hoc etiam quod dico, a quo alius, est quidem ad dignitatem pertinens, sed commune est. unde oportet, ad hoc quod constituat personam, quod determinetur per specialem modum originis.I respond: it should be said that there are only three Persons in God. And the reason of this is that in God, on account of simplicity of essence, there cannot be distinction according to anything absolute, but [only] according to relation, and only according to relation of origin, as will be proved below (d. 26, q. 2, a. 2). Again, a relation of origin cannot constitute a Person if it signifies in common, but it must signify something proper and determinate, for it stands in the place of a constitutive difference with respect to person, and for this [=if it is to serve this function] it must be proper [to one]. Moreover, since 'person' is a name of dignity, that relation must pertain to dignity. Thus in the constituting of Persons one must therefore consider three things, viz., what is the relation of origin, what is proper, and what pertains to dignity. The relation of origin is implied in common, however, in these two things: "He who is from another", and "the other from whom [He is]." When I say "the other from whom", this too is a certain thing pertaining to dignity, but it is common. Hence in order that a Person be constituted, it is necessary that He be determined through a special mode of origin.
in divinis autem non potest esse nisi duplex modus originis, secundum quod omne agens dividitur in agens a natura et agens a voluntate: et istae actiones inventae in creaturis, ut supra dictum est, dist. 4, quaest. 1, art. 1, reducuntur, ut in causam et exemplar, in duas processiones in divinis, quarum una est per modum naturae et vocatur generatio, et alia per modum voluntatis et vocatur spiratio, ut supra dictum est, loc. cit.. oportet igitur ita specificare, a quo alius per generationem, a quo alius per spirationem. haec autem duo non habent repugnantiam: quia idem potest esse principium plurium diversis modis. unde ex hoc non constituentur duae personae, sed una tantum; quia nihil habet virtutem distinguendi, nisi quod habet aliquam rationem oppositionis. sic igitur habemus unam personam, a qua est aliquis per generationem et spirationem, sicut pater. Now, in God there can only be a twofold mode of origin, according to [the way in] which every agent is divided into a natural agent [agent from nature] and a voluntary agent [agent from will]; and those actions which are found in creatures, as was said above (d. 4, q. 1, a. 1), are traced back, as to a cause and exemplar, to the two processions in God, of which the one is through the mode of nature and is called generation, and the other through the mode of will and is called spiration, as was said above in the place cited. One must therefore specify 'the other from whom' through generation, and 'the other from whom' through spiration. But these two do not conflict with each other, since the same thing can be a principle of many in diverse ways. Hence from this ['the other from whom'] is not constituted two Persons but only one, since nothing has the power to bring about a distinction except what has some account of opposition. So therefore we have one Person -- someone from whom there is someone through generation and spiration, namely, the Father.
si autem accipiamus aliud, scilicet, qui est ab alio, quamvis importet relationem originis, tamen non sufficit ad constituendam personam: tum quia commune est, tum quia nihil dignitatis importat. esse enim ab alio potest aliquid vel nobili vel ignobili modo. unde oportet ad hoc quod constituatur persona, quod determinetur per specialem modum ad dignitatem pertinentem; et isti sunt tantum duo in divinis, et ideo oportebit ita dicere: qui est ab alio per generationem, et qui est ab alio per spirationem. ista autem duo non possunt uni convenire, quia una res habet tantum unum modum quo oritur ex alio. non enim idem in specie est a natura et ab arte, nec per putrefactionem et seminationem. et ideo erit una persona quae est ab alia per generationem, et hic est filius; et alia quae est ab alia per spirationem, et hic est spiritus sanctus. et cum istae relationes non possint multiplicari secundum numerum, ita quod remaneat unitas in specie, eo quod non est ibi aliqua divisio materialis, oportet quod sint tantum tres personae.If however we take the other, viz., [the one] who is from another, although this implies a relation of origin, it nevertheless does not suffice to constitute a Person, on the one hand because it is common, on the other because it implies nothing of dignity. For something can be from another in either a noble or an ignoble manner. Hence that a Person be constituted, it is necessary that He be determined through a special mode pertaining to dignity; and [since] there are only two such modes in God, it will therefore be necessary to speak thus: He who is from another through generation, and He who is from another through spiration. But these two cannot belong to one [Person], since one thing has only one mode by which it arises from another, for what is from nature and what is from art are not the same in species, nor what comes about through putrefaction and [what comes about through] fertilization. And therefore there will be one Person who is from another through generation, and this is the Son; and another who is from another through spiration, and this is the Holy Spirit. And since these relations cannot be numerically multiplied in such a way that there would remain unity in species, because [in God] there is no material division, it is necessary that there be only three Persons.
ad primum igitur dicendum, quod processio intellectus et naturae habent quamdam similitudinem per quam distinguuntur a processione per modum voluntatis. quod autem procedit per modum naturae, procedit ut ab uno, si illud perfectum sit; et similiter quod procedit per modum intellectus; non enim plures homines habent unam conceptionem in numero. et ita filio, qui est tantum ab uno, scilicet a patre, attribuitur uterque modus; procedit enim per modum naturae ut filius, et per modum intellectus ut verbum. sed voluntas tendit in alium, et potest esse reciprocatio, ut ex duobus una voluntatis procedat conformitas, quae est unio utriusque. et ideo procedere per modum voluntatis convenit spiritui sancto, qui procedit a duobus, uniens eos, inquantum sunt distinctae personae. inquantum enim sunt una essentia, uniuntur per essentiam; et secundum hoc est inter eos amor essentialis.To the first, therefore, it should be said that the procession of intellect and of nature have a certain likeness by which they are distinguished from the procession through the mode of will. For what proceeds through the mode of nature, proceeds as from one, if that one is perfect; and in like manner what proceeds through the mode of intellect [proceeds as from one, if that one is perfect], for many men [since they do not form one perfect thing] do not have a conception which is one in number [=numerically the same]. And thus each mode is attributed to the Son, who is only from one, viz., from the Father: for as Son He proceeds through the mode of nature, and as Word [He proceeds] through the mode of intellect. But the will tends into another, and [on account of this] there can be reciprocation, as from two [persons] proceeds one conformity of will which is the union of both. And therefore to proceed through the mode of will belongs to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from two, uniting them insofar as they are distinct Persons; for insofar as they are one essence, they are united through essence, and according to this [unity] there is essential love between them.
ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut est in inferioribus, quod non alio actu potentia fertur in objectum et in actum suum, eodem enim actu intellectus intelligit se et intelligit se intelligere; ita etiam cum spiritus sanctus procedat ut amor quo pater amat filium, non oportet quod sit alius amor quo amet illum amorem; et praecipue cum ille amor non differat ab isto nisi secundum numerum, et non secundum rationem. et talis diversitas in divinis non potest esse, ut supra, dist. 9, quaest. 1, art. 1, probatum est.To the second, it should be said that just as in inferior things it is the case that a power is not borne to its object [by one act] and to its own act by yet another act, for in one and the same act intellect understands itself and understands itself to be understanding; so too when the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love by which the Father loves the Son, it is not necessary that there be yet another love by which He loves that love; and especially since that love [if there were another love] does [=would] not differ from the first except according to number, and not according to account; and such [numerical] diversity cannot be in God, as was proved above (d. 9, q. 1, a. 1).
ad tertium dicendum, quod liberalitas et bonitas sunt essentialia; essentialia autem non sunt principia actuum notionalium, nisi secundum quod ipsa essentia est idem re quod proprietas vel notio, ut supra, dist. 2, quaest. unica, art. 3, dictum est. unde bonitas vel liberalitas in patre, non est principium generationis, nisi inquantum bonitas est sua paternitas; in filio autem bonitas non est paternitas sed filiatio. unde eadem bonitate et liberalitate pater generat, et filius generatur, et pater spirat, et spiritus sanctus spiratur. unde secundum augustinum, cum dico, de quo est, est quaestio originis et non aequalitatis; sed cum quaeritur, qualis vel quantus. et ideo per hoc quod spiritus sanctus non producit aliam personam, non est minoris liberalitatis vel bonitatis. To the third, it should be said that liberality and goodness are essential [in God]. Now essential things are not principles of notional acts, except insofar as the essence, according to the thing, is the same as the property or notion, as was said above (d. 2, qu. un., a. 3). Hence, goodness or liberality in the Father is not the principle of generation, except insofar as goodness is His paternity, whereas in the Son goodness is not paternity but filiation. Hence by the very same goodness and liberality the Father generates and the Son is generated, and the Father spirates and the Holy Spirit is spirated. Thus, according to Augustine, when I say "of whom He is", this is a question of origin and not of equality; but [it is a question of equality] when one inquires "of what kind or how much." And therefore from the fact that He does not produce another person, the Holy Spirit is not of a lesser liberality or goodness.
ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia attributa divina sunt principium productionis per modum efficientis exemplaris; sicut bonitatem omnia bona imitantur, et essentiam omnia entia, et sic de aliis. unde omnis illa processio est per modum naturae; et ideo non oportet esse plures modos processionis in divinis.To the fourth, it should be said that all the divine attributes are principle of production through the mode of an efficient exemplar, e.g., the goodness imitated by all goods, the essence imitated by all beings, and so with the others. Hence, all that [kind of] procession is through the mode of nature; and thus it is not necessary that there be many modes of procession in God.
ad ultimum patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt, in corp. art..To the last, the solution is evident from what was said in the body of the article.


© Peter Kwasniewski
(pak@wyomingcatholiccollege.com)

The Aquinas Translation Project
(http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)