In III Sent. D.6, q. 2, a. 1: "Whether Christ is Two in the Neuter?"

Utrum Christus sit duo neutraliter.Whether Christ is two in the neuter.
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur, quod Christus sit duo neutraliter. Isidorus enim dicit in lib. de Trinit.: Mediator Dei et hominum, homo Iesus Christus, quamvis aliud sit de Patre, aliud de Virgine, non tamen alius. Sed ubicumque est aliud et aliud, ibi sunt duo. Ergo Christus est duo. Obj. 1: It seems that Christ is two in the neuter. For Isidore says in the book on the Trinity (1): The Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, although he is other than the Father, and other than the Virgin, yet he is not other (alius). But, wherever there is one thing and another, there are two things. Therefore, Christ is two.
Praeterea, Christus est unum unitate increata, et est unum unitate creata. Unitas autem creata non est unitas increata. Ergo Christus est duo.Obj. 2: Further, Christ is one thing by an uncreated unity and he is one thing by a created unity. But a created unity is not an uncreated unity. Therefore Christ is two.
Praeterea, sicut in trinitate sunt tres personae in una essentia; ita in Christo sunt duae naturae in una persona. sed propter unitatem naturae dicuntur Pater et Filius unum, quamvis non unus. Ergo et propter unitatem personae Christus debet dici unus, et non unum, sed duo propter dualitatem naturarum.Obj. 3: Further, just as there are three persons in one essence in the Trinity; so too there are two natures in one person in Christ. But on account of the unity of nature, the Father and the Son are called one thing (unum), although [they are] not [called] one (unus). Therefore on account of the personal unity Christ ought to be called one, and also not one thing, but two things because of the duality of natures.
Praeterea, Christus secundum quod est Deus, est aliquid quod est Pater; et secundum quod est homo, est aliquid quod est mater. Sed hoc quod est Pater, non est hoc quod est mater. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid; et ita est duo. Obj. 4: Further, Christ insofar as he is God, is something which is the Father; and insofar as he is a man, he is something which is the mother. But the Father is not the mother. Therefore, Christ is something and something; and thus he is two.
Praeterea, Christus est aliquid passibile et aliquid impassibile. Sed passibile non est impassibile. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid. Ergo non est unum. Obj. 5: Further, Christ is something passible and something impassible. But a passible thing is not an impassible thing. Therefore Christ is something and something. Therefore, Christ is not one thing.
Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, Christus totus est ubique, non tamen totum. Sed est ubique secundum quod est Deus. Ergo Christus non est totum Deus. Sed ex hoc quod est Deus, est aliquid. Ergo est aliquid et aliquid; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 6: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide 3,7), the whole (totus) Christ is everywhere, but not the whole thing (totum). But, he is everywhere inasmuch as he is God. Therefore, Christ is not the whole God. But from the fact that he is God, he is something. Therefore he is something and something; and thus the previous objection follows.
Praeterea, Christus non est tantum homo. Sed homo praedicat aliquid unum de ipso. Ergo Christus non est tantum unum aliquid: ergo est duo.Obj. 7: Further, Christ is not only a man. But "man" predicates some one thing of him. Therefore, Christ is not only something one, therefore he is two.
Sed contra, quidquid est, ideo est, quia unum numero est. Si ergo Christus non est unum, nihilest; quod falsum est. To the Contrary, whatever is, is thus, because it is one in number. Therefore, if Christ is not one thing, he is nothing, which is false.
Praeterea, maior est convenientia naturae humanae in Christo ad naturam divinam, quam accidentis ad subiectum. Sed accidens cum subiecto non facit numerum. Ergo nec ratione naturae humanae et divinae dicetur Christus esse duo. Further, the human nature in Christ is more harmonious with the divine nature than an accident is with a subject. But an accident with a subject does not produce something numbered. Therefore, neither may we call Christ two by reason of the human and divine nature.
Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unum, non possunt de se invicem praedicari. Sed Deus praedicatur de homine Christo, et e converso. Ergo Christus est unum. Further, those things which are not one thing cannot be predicated of each other. But we predicate God of the man Christ, and conversely. Therefore Christ is one thing.
Respondeo dicendum, quod neutrum genus est informe et indistinctum; masculinum vero est formatum et determinatum; unde masculinum non praedicatur absolute nisi de re perfecta subsistente; neutrum vero genus de re perfecta subsistente, et de non perfecta; unde non potest dici, quod albedo vel humanitas Petri est aliquis, sed quod est aliquid; de Petro autem possumus dicere, quod est aliquis, et quod est aliquid. Similiter in Christo de persona potest dici est aliquis, et est aliquid: de natura autem quod est aliquid, et non quod est aliquis. Secundum igitur secundam opinionem, de qua agitur, illud aliquid quod est natura assumpta, non praedicatur de Christo: quia non habet rationem hominis, sed humanitatis. Aliquid ergo, secundum quod praedicatur de Christo, non significat tantum naturam, sed suppositum naturae: et quia plurale est geminatum singulare, ideo Christus non posset dici aliqua, nisi essent in eo duo supposita naturarum; quod negat secunda opinio, et similiter tertia; et ideo utraque opinio dicit, quod Christus est unum; sed secunda dicit, quod est unum per se; tertia vero, quod est unum per accidens, sicut albus homo. Sed prima opinio dicit, quod assumptum non tantum habet rationem humanitatis, sed etiam hominis; et tamen non potest dici aliquis, quia est alteri digniori adiunctum, sed dicitur aliquid, et illud aliquid praedicatur de persona assumente; et ideo sequitur quod Christus sit aliquis, scilicet assumens, et aliquod, scilicet assumptum; et quod sit duo neutraliter, sed non masculine. I answer that the neuter genus is unformed and indistinct; but the masculine is formed and determinate; hence the masculine is not predicated absolutely except of a complete (perfecta) subsisting thing; but the neuter genus is predicated absolutely of either a complete or incomplete subsisting thing. Hence we cannot say that the whiteness or humanity of Peter is someone, but we can say that it is something. Now we can say that Peter is someone, and that he is something. Likewise, we can say of the person in Christ "it is someone" and "it is something", but of the nature we can say that it is something and not that it is someone. Therefore, according to the second opinion, of which we are treating, the "something" which is the assumed nature is not predicated of Christ: because it does not have the character of a man, but of humanity. Therefore, "something" insofar as it is predicated of Christ does not signify merely the nature, but the suppositum of the nature: and since the plural is the singular doubled, thus Christ could not be called some things (aliqua), unless there were two supposits of the natures in him; which the second, and also the third, opinion denies; and thus each opinion says that Christ is one; but the second says that he is one per se; while the third says that he is one accidentally, like a white man. But the first opinion says that the thing assumed does not only have the character of humanity, but also of a man; and yet we cannot call [this] "someone", since it is joined to another thing of higher dignity, but it is called "something", and that "something" is predicated of the person assuming; and thus it follows that Christ is someone, namely the one assuming, and something, namely the thing assumed; and that he is two in the neuter, but not in the masculine.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliud partitivum est; unde requiritur aliquod a quo dividatur. Cum autem dicitur, Christus est aliud et aliud, cum aliud non praedicet naturam tantum, sed suppositum naturae (quia humana natura de Christo non praedicatur), requiritur quod sit ibi aliquid distinctum vel divisum a supposito humanae naturae, quod de Christo praedicetur. Hoc autem non potest esse secundum secundam opinionem: quia suppositum divinae naturae non est aliud a supposito humanae naturae; nec divina natura, quae de Christo praedicatur, est aliud a supposito eius, nec per consequens a supposito humanae naturae. Unde secundum hanc opinionem Christus non dicitur proprie aliud et aliud; sed exponendum est, alterius et alterius naturae. Prima vero opinio, quae distinguit supposita naturarum, potest dicere quod Christus est aliud et aliud. Reply 1: "Other" is a partitive term; hence it requires something from which it is divided. Now when we say, "Christ is one thing and another thing", since "other" does not predicate the nature alone, but the supposit of the nature (since human nature is not predicated of Christ), it is necessary that there be here something distinct or divided from the supposit of the human nature, which is predicated of Christ. But this cannot be according to the second opinion: because the supposit of the divine nature is not anything other than the supposit of the human nature; nor is the divine nature, which is predicated of Christ, other than its supposit, neither consequently is it other than the supposit of the human nature. Hence according to this opinion Christ is not properly called one thing and another; but we must explain that he is of one nature and of another nature. But the first opinion which distinguishes the supposits of the natures, can say that Christ is one thing and another thing.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod termini numerales, ut in 1 dictum est, se habent communiter ad personam et naturam; unde loquendo de unitate personali, est tantum una in Christo, secundum quam dicitur unus Christus; loquendo autem de unitate naturali, est duplex unitas. Non tamen sequitur quod Christus sit unum et unum: quia unum quod de Christo praedicatur, non refertur tantum ad naturam, sed ad suppositum naturae, quod non geminatur. Reply 2: Numerical terms, as was said in 1, are related commonly to the person and the nature; hence speaking of personal unity, there is only one in Christ, inasmuch as we say one Christ; but speaking of the natural unity there is a twofold unity. Yet it does not follow that Christ is one thing and one thing; since the one thing which is predicated of Christ, does not refer only to the nature, but to the supposit of the nature, which is not doubled.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod natura divina praedicatur in recto de personis propter identitatem rei; sed duae naturae quae sunt in Christo, non praedicantur de eo in recto: quamvis enim divina natura praedicetur de eo in recto, non tamen humana, sicut nec de aliquo alio homine. Si autem tres personae differrent secundum rem a natura, quamvis esset una numero in eis, non tamen posset propter hoc dici, quod tres personae essent unum simpliciter; sed forte quod essent unus Deus; sicut multi homines dicuntur unus populus. Reply 3: The divine nature is predicated of the person in the nominative on account of the identity of the thing; but the two natures which are in Christ are not predicated of him in the nominative: for although the divine nature is predicated of him in the nominative, yet the human nature is not, just as it is not predicated of any other man. But if the three persons really differed from the nature, although it [s.c. nature] would be in number in them, nevertheless on account of this we could not say, that the three persons were one simply; but perhaps that they were one God; just as many men are called one people.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid quod est mater, ly aliquid non praedicat tantum naturam, sed suppositum naturae, ut patet ex praedictis; relativum autem refert suum antecedens, non gratia suppositi, sed gratia naturae: mater enim non convenit cum Filio in supposito, sed in natura: relativum autem non refert idem secundum suppositum, sed quandoque idem secundum naturam speciei. Cum vero dicitur: est aliquid quod est Pater, ly aliquid praedicat naturam divinam: unde ex hoc sequitur quod humana natura non sit divina natura, non autem quod Christus sit duo. Reply 4: When we say "Christ is something which is the mother", the "something" does not predicate the nature alone, but the supposit of the nature; as is evident from the aforesaid; but a relative term refers to the antecedent supposit, not because of the supposit, but the because of the nature; for the mother does not agree with the Son in a supposit, but in a nature. But the relative term does not refer to the same thing according to the supposit, whenever it refers to the same thing, it is according to the nature of the species; but when we say there is something which is the Father the "something" predicates the divine nature: hence from this it follows that the human nature is not the divine, but not that Christ is two.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid passibile, ly aliquid non praedicat naturam, sed suppositum humanae naturae; quia proprietates naturae denominative praedicantur de supposito, quamvis natura de eo non praedicetur, et etiam proprietates partium. Petrus enim quamvis non sit capillus, est tamen crispus. Cum vero dicitur, Christus est aliquid impassibile, ly aliquid praedicat suppositum divinae naturae, quod non est aliud quam suppositum humanae naturae; vel etiam divinam naturam, quae non est aliud a suo supposito. Unde non sequitur quod sit ibi aliud et aliud: media enim falsa est quae dicit quod aliquid passibile non est aliquid impassibile: idem enim suppositum quod est passibile secundum unam naturam, est impassibile secundum aliam. Reply 5: When we say Christ is something passible, "something" does not predicate the nature, but the supposit of the human nature; since the properties of the nature are predicated denominatively of the supposit, although the nature is not predicated of it, and likewise the properties of the parts. For although Peter is not hair, yet he is curly. But when we say, "Christ is something impassible", the "something" predicates the supposit of the divine nature, which is none other than the supposit of the human nature; or even the divine nature, which is not other than its supposit. Hence it does not follow that there is one thing and another thing here: for the middle [proposition] is false which says that something passible is not something impassible: for the same supposit which is passible according to one nature, and impassible according to the other.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod totus refertur ad personam, totum autem ad naturam. Totum autem, secundum quod hic sumitur, est cui nihil deest: et quia nihil deest de personalitate Filii, quam significat nomen Christi, secundum quod est ubique, quia est persona aeterna; ideo dicitur totus ubique. Deest autem aliquid de natura ei, secundum quod non est ubique; sed tamen illud aliquid non praedicatur de Christo. Unde non sequitur quod Christus sit aliquid et aliquid; sed quod in eo sit aliquid et aliquid. Reply 6: "Whole" [totus] refers to the person, but "a whole thing" [totum] refers to the nature. Now wholes, as it is taken here, are that from which nothing is lacking: and since nothing is lacking from the personality of the Son, which the name Christ signifies, insofar as he is everywhere, since he is an eternal person; thus we say the whole [totus] is everywhere. But something of the nature is lacking to him, insofar as he is not everywhere; but yet that [sense of] "something" is not predicated of Christ. Hence it does not follow that Christ is something and something; but that there is something and something in him.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod termini in praedicato positi tenentur formaliter: unde non conceditur ista, quod Christus sit tantum homo; quia excluderetur omnis alia natura. Ly aliquid autem, et ly unum non determinant aliquam formam vel naturam; sed determinatum suppositum, secundum quod de Christo praedicantur: non enim determinant nisi illud circa quod ponuntur. Unde si diceretur: Christus est tantum unum, vel tantum aliquid, non excludit aliam naturam, sed aliud suppositum: et ideo haec est vera: Christus est tantum aliquid unum; et est in processu illo fallacia consequentis, quia aliquid unum est superius ad hominem. Procedit ergo negative ab inferiori ad superius, cum dictione exclusiva. Reply 7: Terms posited in the predicate are taken formally (Cf. S.T. I, q. 13, a. 12): hence we do not concede that Christ is only a man; since every other nature would be excluded from him. But "something" and "one" do not determine any form or nature; but the supposit is determined, insofar as they are predicated of Christ: for they do not determine [anything] except that concerning which they are posited. Hence if we should say: "Christ is only one thing", or "only something", we do not exclude another nature, but another supposit: and thus this is true: "Christ is only some one thing"; and there is a fallacy of the consequent in that reasoning, since the "something one" is wider in extension than "man". Therefore it proceeds negatively from a term of less extension to one of wider extension, with an exclusive expression.

© Mr. Jason Lewis Andrew West
(jason.west@newman.edu)



The Aquinas Translation Project
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